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The European Parliament, 
- at its sitting of 16 June 1982, referred the motion for a resolution tabled 
by Mr DE PASQUALE and others pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
(Doe. 1-364/82> to the Committee on Transport as the committee responsible 
and to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection for its opinion; 
-at its sitting of 11 April 1983, referred the motion for a resolution tabled 
by Mr MOORHOUSE and others pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
<Doe. 1-21/83) to the Committee on Transport as the committee responsible; 
- at its sitting of 10 October 1983, referred the motion for a resolution tabled 
by Mr SEEFELD and others pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
<Doe. 1-734/83) to the Committee on Transport as the committee responsible 
and to the Political Affairs Committee for its opinion; 
- at its sitting of 27 October 1983, referred the motion for a resolution tabled 
by Mr ANTONIOZZI pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure (Doe. 1-674/83> 
to the Committee on Transport as the committee responsible and to the 
Political Affairs Committee for its opinion; 
-.at its sitting of 16 November 1983, referred the motion for a resolution tabled 
by Mr EPHREMIDIS and others pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
<Doe. 1-973/83> to the Committee on Transport as the committee responsible. 
At its meeting of 26 January 1983 the committee decided to draw up a report and 
appointed Mr Carlo RIPA di MEANA rapporteur. 
The draft report was considered at the meetings of 26 May 1983, 1 December 1983, 
24 January 1984, 28 February 1984 and at the last meeting the motion for a 
resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously with one abstention. 
The following took part in the vote : Mr Seefeld, chairman; Dame Shelagh Roberts, 
Mr Carossino, vice-chairmen; Mr Ripa di Meana, rapporteur; Mr Albers, Mr Karl 
Fuchs (deputizing for Mr Baudis>, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, Mr Janssen Van Raay 
<deputizing for Mr Vandewiele>, Mr Key, Mr Klinkenborg, Mr Loo (deputizing for 
Mr Gabert>, Mr Martin, Mr Moorhouse, Mr Moreland (deputizing for Mr Cottrell>, 
Mr Nikolaou <deputizing for Mr Lagakos>, Mr Veronesi (deputizing for Mr Cardia>. 
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ThP. Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on the Environment, Public 
. 
Health and Consumer Protection decided not to draw up opinions. 
fhc report was tabled on 8 March 1984. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Committee on Transport hereby submits to the European Parliament the following 
motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the safety of air transport in Europe 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr DE PASQUALE and 
others pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the safety of air 
transport in the zone between the islands of Ponza and Ustica (Doe. 1-364/82>, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr MOORHOUSE and others 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on Community accession to the 
EUROCONTROL Convention (Ooc. 1-21/83>, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI pursuant 
to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the brutal shooting down of a South 
Korean airliner by the Soviet airforce <Doe. 1-674/83>, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SEEFELD and others 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on measures following the shooting 
down of a South Korean airliner (Doe. 1-734/83), 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS and others 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the safety of civilian flights 
during military exercises (Doe. 1-973/83>, 
having regard to the report by Mr NOE on the promotion of efficient air traffic 
management and cant ro l (Doe. 1 06/79), 
having regard to the report by Mr JUNOT on safety measures in aircraft 
(Doe. 1-788/82>, 
- having regard to the ICAO resolution of 16 September 1983 on the shooting down 
of the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 on 1 September 1983, 
-having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport <Doe. 1-1551/83), 
A. whereas the safety levels for air ~ransport in Europe are already high, 
B. whereas it is vital not only to preserve but also to improve safety levels 
given the prospect of an increase in air traffic, 
C. whereas the economic difficulties besetting the Member States might lead tc 
budgetary restrictions affecting air transport facilities, equipment and 
infrastructures, 
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D. whereas these economic difficulties might also lead to attempts by some 
airlines to achieve excessively high productivity likely to have an adverse 
effect on the safety of air transport, 
E. whereas the safety of air transport depends on a large number of factors 
<technical, regulatory, and human) which need to be considered in their 
totality, 
F. concerned at the frequent interference between civil and military air traffic, 
G. aware of the existence of a body of standards laid down by the international 
organizations, and at the same time anxious that they should be implemented 
scrupulously, 
1. Is convinced that the European Community must act, using all the means at 
its disposal and which it would be able to mobilize in the interests of in-
creased safety of air transport in Europe, working in close cooperation with 
the International Civil Aviation Organization <ICAO> and the relevant inter-
national organizations and associations; 
~}~E_!egar~_!9--~ faciliti~sJ e~_ipment and infrastructures needed for air 
~-~-~-~-sport 
2. Notes, first of all, the substantial and alarming differences between the 
European Community countries as regards the facilities and equipment for air 
traffic control and hopes, as regards the applicant countries, that the 
major investment efforts made over the last two years, notably by Spain, will 
continue at the same rate and an schedule; 
3. Is concerned at the potential danger inherent in poor radar cover of certain 
dirspace zones, particularly in southern Europe (Adriatic Sea, Tyrrhenian 
Sea and Aegean Sea) and approach conditions at some airports and calls for 
particular attention to be given to ground radar; 
4. Considers that all the Member States of the European Community must be 
equipped with facilities of an equally high technological level and that the 
best and most economical means of achieving this, as far as air traffic 
control is concerned, is for all Member States to accede to the EUROCONTROL 
Convention; 
5. Takes the view that, in accordance with the above, the Member States of the 
European Community must encourage the use of equipment and facilities of a 
standardized design, preferably European; 
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6. Suppor·t~: tht" oroupin\1 of ."irl in~!l, ~uc:h u thf' ATlAS nnci KSSIJ Ciroup!; with 
a vit>w to the maintenance o1 their a1rcr·aft itnd hnpt-s thM this typt' 111 
initiative, which increases safety, will become generalized; 
7. Hopes that wherever possible, all commercial and private aircraft will be 
equipped with the most modern and most effective communication devices such 
as transmitters enabling the aircraft to be identified and its precise 
location plotted (transponders>; 
8. Draws attention to the problems occasioned by interference with radio com-
munications between aircraft and ground control centres from certain radio, 
TV and CB radio transmissions, a problem which is particularly acute in 
some European Community countries, and calls for this aspect to be examined 
in conjunction with the European Conference on Posts and Telecommunications; 
9. Considers that more precise systerns should be defined and prescribed within 
the ICAO for communications between aircrafi and air traffic controllers; 
10. Calls for great attention to be paid to meteorological problems : the 
quality and promptness of the information provided, development of equipment 
able to give warnings of phenomena such as wind shear, clear air turbulence, 
air vortices and optical illusions, as also problems associated with 
specific and local phenomena such as bird ingestion <in particular by pro-
viding an information system to keep airports informed about mass movements 
of migratory birds>; 
11. Considers that a more energetic approach must be taken towards the develop-
ment of the concept of 'passive safety' in air transport i.e. those elements 
likely to reduce the scale and consequences of accidents; 
12. Refers, in the context of 'passive safety' measures in aircraft, to the 
proposals set out in its resolution <Doe. 1-788/82> of 17 December 1982 
review of safety standards with regard to the inflammability and toxicity 
of materials used for the internal fittings of aircraft, the design, con-
struction and fixing of seats, the design and resistance of seat belts, 
the closing of overhead lockers, mechanisms and conditions for rescue 
operations; 
13. Is concerned at the appearance on the aircraft maintenance market of counter-
feit spare parts which have been proved to jeopardize safety, in particular 
by the complaint made to GATT in July 1983 by the European Communities; 
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with regard to air traffic management and control 
14. Is keenly aware of the problems arising from the simultaneous use of 
European airspace by civil and military aircraft; 
15. Considers that better management of our airspace in favour of civil 
aviation would make it possible to simplify flight paths, reduce flight 
time, cut fuel costs, and thereby cut air fares; 
16. Draws the attention of the Member States to the very real dangers caused 
by the occasionally untimely passage of military aircraft from various 
Member States of the European Community or third countries during 
manoeuvres and exercises <notably in the case of aircraft flying to and 
from aircraft carriers cruising in international waters>, in particular 
those carried out in the "editerranean area, but also, apparently, in 
North-West Europe; 
17. Believes that there should be greater coordination between civil and 
military authorities, between airlines, between the management of civil 
airlines and the General Staffs of the armed forces, as also between civil 
and military pilots, making possible, inter alia, the use by military 
pilots of civilian frequencies in cases of emergency; 
18. Notes that communications between the different regional air traffic 
control centres are effected by means of elementary procedures which may 
prove faulty, whereas a technologically more advanced and more reliable 
automatic link-up system could be introduced such as the automatic data 
links in use on the Maastricht-London/London-Maastricht route; 
19. Commends the work of the European Air Navigation Planning Group <EANPG>, 
an ICAO working party on medium-and long-term planning of air traffic 
flow; 
20. Welcomes the recent decision taken by the EUROCONTROL standing committee 
concerning an increase in the operational powers of that body to cover 
all en-route traffic above the northern part of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; 
21. Calls urgently on the competent authoritiesof these four countries to 
implement this decision of 15 November 1983 as quickly as possible and 
calls on its committee responsible, in consultation with the appropriate 
committees of the national parliaments, to monitor carefully the strict 
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observance of the undertakings entered into in respect of the Maastricht 
EUROCONTROL air traffic control centre; 
n. Jnvitl"!s the Member States meeting in the Council to consid"r the possibility 
of amending the EUROCONTROL Convention to enable that organhation to 
assume the responsibilities of a European air traffic agency in association 
with neighbouring third countries and invites any Member States which have 
not yet acceded to the EUROCONTROL Convention to do so soon and calls on 
all Member States to entrust their en-route air traffic control operations 
to EUROCONTROL; 
23. Reiterates its profound indignation at the brutal destruction of a South 
Korean airliner by a Soviet military aircraft which resulted in the deaths 
of 269 civilians, providing a tragic illustration of the way in which the 
safety of air transport can be jeopardized in frontier regions by military 
action; 
24. Expresses the wish that ICAO submit as soon as possible proposals for 
standards and recommendations to prevent the recurrence of this type of 
accident in particular by improving the monitoring of civilian aircraft 
flying along border routes and means of alerting an aircraft which deviates 
from its flight path; 
w~-~~- regard to ~.!.'!.._and social factors 
25. Expresse~ the wish that air controllers be given better training facilitie~ 
<for basic and in-service training) which are identical in all the countries 
of the European Community (particularly through exchange schemes between 
Member States and EUROCONTROL training programmes> particularly in view of 
the constant and rapid development of technical processes; 
26. Has doubts about conditions under which some countries issue private pilot's 
licences and wondP.rs whether there should not be stricter controls over 
recognition and closer scrutiny of the conditions under which those pilots 
are trained; 
27. Calls on the Commission in this connection to submit to it a proposal for a 
directive on the mutual recognition of the various categories of pilot's 
licences; 
28. Believes that despite the efforts of ICAO and lATA, the various existing 
aircraft incident information and notification systems are inadequate; 
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l9. Calls on the Member States meeting in the Council to formulate, as soon as 
possible and in the context of the general policy on air transport, an 
overall concept of air transport safety, taking account of all its impli-
cations; 
30. Calls on the Member States to harmonize their standards and practices vis-a-
vis the Chicago Convention on international civil aviation; 
31. Considers it essential for the European Community to be granted observer 
status at ICAO; 
32. Takes the view that Directive 80/1266/EEC on future cooperation and mutual 
assistance between the Member States in the field of air accident investi-
gation should be strengthened by introducing an information compilation 
and notification system on all accidents and incidents involving civil air-
craft over 2,250 kg, and including those involving military aircraft; 
33. Believes that it should be made easier for the European Community to finance 
infrastructures and equipment which would guarantee identical air traffic 
safety conditions in the various Member States; 
34. Calls on the Commission to initiate a dialogue with the Safety Committee of 
the AEA (Association of European Airlines> and calls on the governments to 
actively support the work of that committee; 
35. Invites the Commission to draw up a series of proposals to enable the idea3 
set out in this resolution to be implemented; 
36. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the 
Commission of the European Communities and asks the Commission to forward 
it to ICAO and to ECAC. 
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8 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 - THE FORM OF THE REPORT 
1. This report originated with a motion for a resolution by Mr de PASQUALE 
and others on the safety of air transport in the zone between the islands 
of Ponza and Ustica <1>, which drew attention to an apparent correlation 
between military air exercises and various inflight incidents and possibly 
the July 1980 disaster to an ITAVIA flight between Bologna and Catania in 
which 81 passengers' lives were lost. 
A second motion for a resolution to the same effect was subsequently 
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS and others on civil aviation safety during 
military exercises in Greece <2>. 
2. Although these motions for resolutions were very specific, they cannot 
limit the scope of this report which covers air transport safety as a 
whole. 
While the report was being drawn up events showed that air transport 
safety could be brutally threatened in other ways, as in the shooting down 
by the Soviet military authorities of the Korean Airlines Boeing 747 with 
the loss of 269 lives, on which motions for resolutions were tabled by 
Mr ANTONIOZZI (3) and Mr SEEFELD and others <4>, and the two accidents in 
two weeks at Madrid. 
3. For many reasons, but primarily the sudden and catastrophic nature of air 
disasters, even though the latter are rare events, air transport safety is 
a sensitive matter to the public. 
<1> Doe. 1-364/82 
<2> Doe. 1-973/83 
<3> Doe. 1-674/83 
<4> Doe. 1-734/83 
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4. Parliament has yet to consider the problem as a whole. Mr NOE's major 
report <1> dealt primarily with the ATC aspects of air transport, while 
Mr JUNOT's recent report was a brilliant piece of work but confined to the 
design and fitting out of aircraft. 
5. Your rapporteur would like to take a general approach to air transport 
safety covering all its implications. To that end, distinctions will be 
made between: 
- industrial aspects (equipment, infrastructure> 
- regulatory aspects <air transport procedures and rules> 
- human aspects <flight crews and ground staff). 
6. The problem of terrorist acts and piracy, while not underestimated as it 
is a serious threat to air safety, will not be considered here as they are the 
result of willful and deliberate actions which have no causal relation with 
air transport. 
7. Geographically the report will of course cover the territory of the 
European Community, but the international nature of air transport requires 
it also to consider various other European countries, such as Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden, Norway and Yugoslavia, and of course Spain and Portugal 
with a view to enlargement. 
II - PROCEDURE FOLLOWED 
8. The technical nature of this report should not conceal the fact that 
assessment of many aspects is still a very subjective matter. Your 
rapporteur felt obliged to take more active steps to supplement the data , 
studies and reports available to him, as follows: 
- by a questionnaire (2) sent to all European air transport undertakings, 
associations of international European undertakings, pilots' and air 
traffic controllers• unions, and relevant international organizations 
<Eurocontrol, ICAO, the ECAC>, whose replies have in general provided a 
wealth of information; 
<1> Doe. 49/78 
(2> Annex Il 
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-by asking the civil and military aviation authorities in the "ember 
States of the European Community for information on near misses, which 
revealed the reluctance of most "ember States to provide this type of 
information, a matter to which we shall return; 
-by interviews with representatives of airline pilots• and air traffic 
controllers' associations and of aviation undertakings and authorities 
in certain "ember States. 
9. The mass of data that has been collected has made possible first of all a 
concept of air transport safety in Europe, an analysis of the 
circumstances producing accidents, the factors jeopardizing safety and 
finally the recommendations resulting from our work, especially those 
applicable within the European Community. 
PART ONE: CIRCU"STANCES OF ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS 
1 - A CONCEPT OF AIR TRANSPORT SAFETY IN EUROPE 
10. Although three major air accidents occurred in less than three months, 
between September and December 19831 it is indisputa?le that, whether 
measured by dis'tance covered or passengers carried, air tf'a\lel is one of 
the safest modes of tr~sport. On average, ·betwP.en 800 and 1000 Lives 
are lost each year throughout the world. 
11. In the western world the safety figures are even higher as, over the long 
term, the number of accidents has fallen to 1 per million flights as 
opposed to 3 for the rest of the world. 
12. Air transport is a field in which national and international standards and 
rules, especially under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization <ICAO>, are highly detailed, comprehensive and generally 
observed. 
13. These three things had to be said to place this report in its context. It 
does not seek sensationalism, but ways of improving or at least 
maintaining the present high level of safety in air transport. 
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• 14. Substantial improvements in air transport safety can still be made, by 
action on the frequency and the consequences of accidents. Most accidents 
<75%> do in fact occur in the vicinity of airports and some of them are 
survivable. On the evidence of recent disasters, the fact that there have 
been some survivors has tended to show that there could have been more 
even if the accident itself could not have been prevented. 
The figures for near misses alone show the scope for improving air traffic 
safety by reducing their number. 
15. aefore we think of improving it, we must maintain the present safety 
level. It is threatened by a number of factors. First of all, the 
increase in air traffic may indirectly jeopardize safety. The economic 
crisis might also persuade certain governments to reduce appropriations 
for investment in improving air traffic control. There is also a danger 
that the deteriorating economic climate, in conjunction with more or less 
rigorous deregulation policies might also lead some chJrter companies or 
regional air transport undertakings to adopt austerity measures which might 
jeopardile flight safety. Your rapporteur is referring in particular to 
reports that pilots, particularly in the USA, had recently been required 
to perform administrative and book-keeping work in addition to their 
specific duties (1). For the moment this does not seem to affect the MembEr 
States of the European Community, but vigilance is required to ensure 
better working conditions for pilots. 
16. Geography provides a further argument, if one is needed, for a European 
approach to air safety. Europe is in fact a massive and unusual 
concentration of population and cities - over 200 of which have an airport 
which results in particularly dense air traffic, with many passengers 
carried and a mass of connections. This situation is further complicated 
by the patchwork of European States with different levels of d~velopment, 
different rules and separate civil and military airspace, together with 
military systems acting with NATO. 
<1> The French newspaper LIBERATION of 13 October 1983, in an article on the 
competition between American airline companies, quoted in particular the 
following statement by a NEW YORK AIR pilot : 'I earn half the pay of my 
Continental colleagues and when I am not flying, I do office work. But 
at least I have a job.' 
- 14 - PE 86.425/fin. 

11 -~iNtRA! H~FLfCllONS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AIR ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS 
17. Accidents and incidents involving aircraft of weights over 2,250 kg are 
listed in the ADREP data bank of the International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization CICAO>, which now contains reports on some 10,000 occurrences 
notified to it by governments. 
18. ICAO classifies the circumstances of accidents and incidents by phase of 
operation, 30 of which cover 964 of occurrences, which we have consolidated 
to show percentages worldwide. 
Aircraft standing or taxiing 8 
Take-off 20 
Climb 5 
Cruise 14 
Descent 4 
Approach 23 
Landing 22 
Various 4 
Source: ICAO ADREP Syystem 18.7.83 
This table is most significrnt as it shows that the critical phases are 
take-off and above all landing, while contrary to popular belief, occur-
rences during cruise flight are relatively infrequent. 
19. Occurrences are rarely due to one factor alone, but to a chain of events. 
• I It 1s then very difficult to identify the crucial factor if indeed there 
is one. 
20. In this line of inquiry, ICAO's AOREP System provides a good deal of use-
ful information. The computer printouts we have received classify occur-
rences in four main categories: 
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Personnel factors 2862 
Aircraft system factors 1042 
Weather factors 652 
Aerodrome/airways factors 250 
The most frequent causes of occurrences related to personnel were •pilot 
tailed to follow procedures or instructions•, 'pilot, inadequate 
' pre-flight preparation or planning•, •maintenance personnel: inadequate 
maintenance and/or inspection•. 
As regards the aircraft itself, engines and landing gear were the most 
frequent causes quoted. 
In respect of airports, the state of runways (patches of oil, ice, snow>, 
various obstructions and inadequate lighting were the most frequent causes 
quoted. 
Finally among weather factors, the most frequent were •turbulence in 
cloud, low cloud base, fog•. 
~1. At all events, the circumstances capable of causing accidents or incidents 
tor each category are listed in such great detail that none <whether by 
chance or by design) shows up in the ICAO figures as being genuinely 
crucial. 
In general, the human factor seems to be undoubtedly the most important. 
However this statement must be qualified, as it is in fact always possible 
to blame human error even in the extreme case of bad aircraft design. In 
the case of the cargo hold ~losures on the first generation DC 10s, should 
we blame the mechanism or the man who designed it? 
~2. Furthermore, in view of the variety of possible causes, each of those 
involved, air traffic controllers, pilots, manufacturers, and the public 
authorities, all tend to try to put the •responsibility• on the other or 
others; this gives rise to widely varying assessments of safety aspects 
which could be improved. 
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Ill - NEAR MISSES 
23. Of those incidents which can turn into much more serious occurrences, near 
misses are particularly interesting. 
First of all because in themselves they reveal many aspects of flight 
~atety relating both to equipment (airborne and on the ground>, flight 
procedures and personnel (pilots and controllers>. 
An analysis of near misses is also precisely what is called for in two of the 
motions for resolutions on which this report is based, by Mr de PASQUALE 
and Mr EPHREMIOIS. 
Finally, this category of incident is more frequent in some countries of 
the European Community than others, and is a subject on which the public 
is given very little information. 
24. Knowledge of near misses comes mainly from information passed on by pilots 
to air transport undertakings and/or·the civil and military authorities. 
lATA is undoubtedly the most consistent source, collecting and analysing 
near misses through its members. ICAO does not deal with many of these 
incidents <as a state must first have carried out an enquiry into them> 
and only fairly recently, since 1980. 
25. lATA classes the risk involved in near misses as follows: 
A. Grave risk 
8. Possible risk 
c. No risk 
o. Indeterminate risk 
lATA lists 140 near misses in the Member States of the Community in 1982, 
·------------broken down as follows: <1.10.82-30.9.83) 
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. 
BELGIUM 5 
DENMARK 4 
GERMANY 40 
GREECE 19 
FRANCE 31 
IRELAND 1 
ITALY 13 
LUXEMBOURG 0 
NETHERLANDS 6 
UNITED KINGDOM 21 
140 
Germany heads the list, followed by France, the United Kingdom, Greece and 
Italy. Outside the European Community we note that there were 35 near 
misses in Spain and 2 in Portugal. 
26. The trend over the last five years is particularly significant. 
EEC COUNTRIES 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
BELGIUM 14 9 4 5 2 
DENMARK 4 4 3 1 1 
GERMANY 82 70 60 56 51 
GREECE 11 10 10 5 17 
FRANCE 63 68 54 31 25 
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 1 
ITALY 15 14 10 12 18 
LUXEMBOURG 0 0 0 0 0 
NETHERLANDS 8 8 7 8 13 
UNITED KINGDOM 35 39 36 29 32 
TOTAL EEC 232 222 184 147 160 
SPAIN 54 66 46 34 25 
PORTUGAL 5 8 12 8 0 
The general trend is downward in every country apart from Italy, where 
there is little change, and Greece. The figures for Germany, Belgium and 
Spain show particularly marked decreases. 
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27. The actual degree of risk varies widely from country to country, using the 
A, e, C and 0 categories mentioned in paragraph 25. 
EEC COUNTRIES (1) A 9 c 0 
FRANCE 11 14 2 4 
GERMANY 4 23 13 -
GREECE 4 11 4 -
ITALY 2 9 1 1 
NETHERLANDS 1 4 1 -
UNITED KINGDOM 3 4 11 3 
EEC TOTAL 25 65 32 8 
==========a••====~a====•==~========= ========= F========= ======== ====== 
SPAIN 15 18 0 2 
PORTUGAL - 1 - 1 
Source: lATA 1982 
In some countries, France and Spain in particular, there are especially 
high numbers of serious risks. 
28. The type of aircraft involved in near misses, military, commercial, 
private and others, is also a consideration. 
EEC COUNTRIES Military Civil General Others 
aircraft aircraft Aviation 
FRANCE 4 18 8 1 
GERMANY 15 2 16 7 
GREECE 6 13 - -
ITALY 6 2 4 1 
NETHERLANDS 2 1 3 -
UNITED KINGDOM 9 8 2 2 
EEC TOTAL 42 44 33 11 
================== l:=:ua========== ============= ============= ~========== 
SPAIN 8 17 10 -
PORTUGAL 0 1 1 -
Source: lATA August 1982 
<1> figures for other EEC countries not available 
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The most significant factor to emerge from the table is undoubtedly the 
jnvolvement of military aircratts in over 30% of near misses listed by 
lATA, to which we should also add the significant proportion of "others". 
The proportion is also much higher in Germany and Italy. This factor is 
all the more worth mentioning out as civil airspace is very restricted, as 
we shall be seeing later, and more near misses with commercial or general 
aviation aircraft flying in this airspace might have been expected. 
There can be several causes of near misses, and we have broken them down 
by category and country, also for 1982. 
F 0 Gr It NL UK I EEC 
TOTAL 
·or by civil air traffic 11 6 9 4 1 7 38 
lt roller 
I 
·or by military air traffic 
1troller 1 
I 
1 2 
:erference between instrument 
1 23 ight and visual flight<IFR/VFR) 5 13 1 3 1 
·or by civil pilot 6 1 4 1 2 14 
·or by military pilot 10 2 4 1 1 18 
·or by general aviation pilot 2 11 2 1 16 
)rdination military/civil air 
lft i c 1 1 1 1 3 7 
)rdination civil/military air 
tffic 2 1 3 
1er causes and not specified 9 2 2 3 3 19 I j 
Source : lATA 1982 
The most frequent causes seem to be errors by civil air traffic control, 
interference between visual flight and instrument flight, and errors by 
military pilots, general aviation pilots and civil aviation pilots. 
From the nature of the information it has been impossible to make 
correlations between types of aircraft involved, which could have been 
very interesting. 
, Over and above these impressive and indeed disturbing figures, various 
conversations and the juxtaposition of certain statistical sources lead us 
to believe that the figure of 140 near misses over the Member States in 
the European Community in 1982 ought perhaps to be doubled or trebled, in 
view of the information in the next paragraph. 
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31. First of all, rATA only records incidents involving the airline companies 
which are lATA members; secondly, these figures only cover inci~ents which 
have been declared voluntarity by pilots, ·i.e.:they are.not part of any 
compulsory procedure. Incidents between general aviation aircraft or 
between general aviation and military aircraft, are not included. The 
differences can thus be considerable. 
3?.. In fact, for 1982 lATA records 13 near misses in Italy while the Italian 
authorities, via the independent agency for flight assistance to general 
air traffic lists 52 near misses, 15 or so with unidentified aircraft. 
Comparisons between the figures produced in Germany by lATA and those of 
the Federal Air Traffic Control Agency (BFS) are also revealing 
. 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
IATA figures 82 70 60 56 51 
BFS figures 156 139 107 50 43 
Note the paradox that while the government figures for 1977 are twice those 
of lATA, in 1980 and 1981 they are actually lower. Similar examples are 
to be found in the other Member States. What is the explanation ? Is it 
simply a question of different statistical methods ? Is there an attempt 
to minimize certain incidents ? Which ones and why ? 
Your rapporteur would have liked to give answers to these questions, but 
the only 'neutral' organization likely to provide this type of information, 
the EUROCONTROL Directorate General, did not provide the details I had 
requested in writing, believing that the questions in the questionnaire 
contained subjective elements. 
Uncertainty is definitely undesirable in this sphere. Scrupulous recording 
of near misses and the publication of results <at national and Community 
level) are the only way to destroy the myths, which is so necessary, and 
to find remedies and thus reduce the extent of the problem • 
33. It is already clear that safety in the air involves men, machines and 
procedures. Of course in a report of this nature it is impossible to make 
an exhaustive analysis of all the factors involved; your rapporteur has 
therefore chosen a number of facets to each main aspect, which seem to him 
the most relevant and sensitive as regards safety. 
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PART TWO THE AVIATION SAFETY FACTORS CONSIDERED 
I - AVIATION EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURES 
A. Aircraft 
<a> E_e.!_i,in_a.!!,d_i.!!,t_!r.!!.a.!:. !.r!.a.!!.gem.!.n!; .e_a.!_s_!_v,! .!.a.!.e!Y_i.!!, !_i!.c!.a.!t 
34. As stated above, safety levels may be raised by reducing the number of 
dead or injured in accidents, thus limiting their consequences, by devel-
~~.!'9 th~-~~~- of 'passive safety•- in a2..!:..._!_~2~sport (1). 
35. The Committee on Transport recently considered this problem in the report 
drawn up by Mr JUNOT on safety measures in aircraft <2> in which it is 
stated that the causes of death and injury in survivable accidents might 
be divided into four categories 
<a> fire and its consequences, i.e. burns or intoxication; 
(b) difficulties in evacuating passengers; 
(c) transformation of baggage or other objects in the passenger cabin into 
projectiles; 
d) insufficient strength of equipment inside the passenger cabin (seats, 
seat belts, various other equipment>. 
36. Unfortunately these situations, especially fire, occur only too 
frequently; we would mention the 1973 accident to a VARIG (Brazil> 
aircraft which made a forced landing at Paris, the fire in the Saudi 
Arabian Airlines L-101 in 1980 and recently the fire in an Air Canada DC9 
which killed 23 of the 41 passengers although the aircraft remained 
structurally intact (the pilot having miraculously managed to land). 
37. Extensive research work carried out by the National Transportation Safety 
Board and the Federal Aviation Administration CFAA> in the United States, 
and by international organizations (lATA, ICAO> in Europe, have revealed 
that there is room for substantial improvement in present aircraft design. 
<1> The term passive safety used in the automobile sector Cas opposed to 
active safety, i.e. accident prevention> although unfamiliar in aviation, 
seems a good rendering of a requirement of aircraft design. 
<2> Doe. 1-788/82, p. 14 
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38. On this point your rapporteur would emphasize his full support for the 
resolution adopted by the European Parliament on safety measures in air-
craft <1>, in particular paragraph 1 which calls for a review of safety 
standards with regard to 
- inflammability and toxicity of materials used for the fitting out of 
the inside of aircraft, 
-design, construction and fixing of seats, 
- the design and str~ngth of seat belts, 
- closing of overhead lockers, 
-explicit instructions on the outside for all professional voluntary res-
cue workers concerning the mechanisms for opening doors and emergency 
exits, 
quantity and size of objects allowed in the passenger cabin. 
<b> Maintenance of aircraft 
- -~~,!7_9.~!'!.r.a.~~~l!! 
39. The great complexity of aircraft makes the quality and frequency of main-
tenance vital to safety. Maintenance is such a complex and costly matter 
that airlines in Europe have formed groups : the ATLAS consortium comprising 
Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, Lufthansa and Sabena, while the KSSU Group 
comprises KLM, SAS, Swissair and UTA. These are the principal European 
groups handling maintenance for their members and outside customers 
(private carriers, business aviation). The wealth of experience accumu-
lated by these groups guarantees the quality of their maintenance. 
- the deficiencies 
40. On consideration, maintenance seems to be a minor problem in the case of 
the European national airlines. The same cannot be said of a number of 
charter companies using old or inadequately ~aintained aircraft. Recent 
disasters have raised the question of whether the financial situation of 
certain European companies has caused them to reduce their maintenance 
spending <2>. Such cases seem to be even more common outside Europe. 
This raises the problem of whether such aircraft should be allowed into 
Europe, as the adoption of especially strict rules in Europe, and standards 
-----(1) OJ No. C 13/246, 17.1.83 
<2> Le Figaro, 15.9.82 reporting on the accident to a DC 10 at Malaga in which 
59 people died. 
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higher than those applied in other parts of the world might lead to 
deflections of trade tow3rds other countries. 
41. To conclude on the matter of maintenance, your rapporteur would mention a 
~pec if i r. problem, th~ ~~erfeit_~_':l9_'?f aircraft and -~~S>pter parts. In 
July 1983 the European Community approached the GATT in an attempt to stamp 
out this practice. In its complaint it states <1> 'Some of the more seriou5 
Ld~~s in which counterfeiting has been found to have compounded the risk of 
u~ing sub-standard products include : 
5.1 Counterfeit aircraft brakes manufactured from soft rather than 
hardened steel. 
5.2 Counterfeit aircraft bolts which broke after installation on a new air-
craft and where it was concluded after investigation that there existed 
a "clear and present danger of a disastrous crash caused by bogus bolts". 
5.3 Counterfeit fire detection and control systems for aircraft engines. 
5.~ Counterfeit helicopter parts which are believed to have been the cause 
of several accidents and have involved the helicopter company in 
litigation. • 
It this information had not been the subject of an official Community state-
ment and had not been checked with the Commission, your rapporteur would 
hdve treated it with the utmost caution as it seems so outrageous; I am 
having a file drawn up on this subject. Thorough investigations must be 
undertaken both as regards sanctions and measures taken. 
(1> f-'r·inted in EUROPUDOCUMt:NTS, special bulletin issued by Agence Europe No. 
126Y, 25 July 1983, p. 3 
P[ 36.1, 25/ i Hl. 
' 

~. Air traffic control equipment 
<a> General Considerations 
42. The regulation of air traffic begins with a flight plan drawn up by the 
pilot. In flight the aircraft is in communication with air traffic 
controllers on the ground. Radio links are supplemented by radar 
surveillance, which is vital in airport approach zones <1>. There is primary 
radar, the original form of electromagnetic detection, which shows bearing and 
distance from the transmitter on a screen <2> and secondary radar which 
requires the active participation of the aircraft by means of a transponder; 
according to the type of transponder - mode A <aircraft identification and 
position> or mode C <with height indication> secondary radar gives far more 
accurate information. 
43. The superiority of secondary radar is more apparent than real, as it shows 
only aircraft equipped with transponders. We should also mention satellite 
radar <the Canadian MSAT system or·the European PROSAT programme), which may 
hold the future for air traffic control. 
<b> Radar cover in Europe 
44. Before considering this point, we need to consider whether the quality 
of radar cover should be regarded as a safety factor. ICAO representatives 
consider the question to be misleading. Higher or lower quality radar systems 
could only affect the capacity of the airlanes. As regards air traffic 
control, radar does allow smaller horizontal and vertical intervals between 
aircraft than does radio contact, and in the crowded airspace over Europe 
this is absolutely vital. 
<1> This is true over Europe, but for example over parts of Africa radio 
contact alone is used and there is no radar cover at all 
<2> 3-D radar does exist, which shows the height of the aircraft but, it being 
possible to determine the height of aircraft by other means, cost reasons 
limit its application to military systems 
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4~. ·However, other information at our disposal leads us to believe that the 
variety of checks possible with radar, and especially secondary radar, 
added to other ·forms. of identification, are an extra safety factor. 
46. R.a~_a_r __ c_e>:_~-~! __ i_n_~-~-~-.:.e.~.t.!~.!. area of Europe would appear to be completely 
s~-~~~~~to~. The Maastricht EUROCONTROL Centre is the most advanced in 
the world. The high technical quality of the installations should not how-
ever blind us to certain facts, such as the frequency of near misses in 
German airspace. 
There is however more room for criticism in the more outlying regions of 
... ---·-- ·-·--·-----
~?~~~er~~-~EE~· Within the European Community, there are weak points in 
I_t_~-~ along the Adriatic coast and in much of the southern Tyrrhenian area 
<south of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia). However, in the course of visits to 
the Italian authorities, your rapporteur has been able to ascertain that 
progress is being made, in particular with the installation of an MRT 
<multi radar tracking) system. !n Greece, the air traffic control system 
!~~U~!_~a great -~al e>:_f modernization, for controlling aircraft both en 
route and at airport approaches. The EIB has already begun to help finance 
radar systems in Greece. 
47. The radar cover over the Iberian peninsula should be mentioned. In the 
opinion which it drew up in 1982 on the enlargement of the European Commun-
ity to include Spain and Portugal our committee had criticized their air 
traffic control (1). 
Your rapporteur, who also drew up that opinion, has found that the situation 
has improved considerably in this respect, particularly in Spain. An 
extensive programme, the SACTA plan, covering modernization of the instal-
lations up to 1987, will provide Spain in due course with one of the most 
modern and most complete radar covers. 
In terms of capital investment the sums involved increased almost sixfold 
between 1981 and 1983. 
The SACTA plan is certainly very ambitious and the determination of its 
promoters is remarkable, but it requires a considerable financial effort 
which will intensify over the next fe~ years. We must therefore hope that 
the necessary resources will be allocated to this plan and that it can 
benefit from EIB loans. 
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48. We have made reference above to the compartmentalization of European air-
space. That part located above the Mediterranean, between Italy and Spain 
is divided in a some~hat irrational manner, as the following diagram shows 
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One can understand that this situation between France, Italy and Spain has 
arisen for historical reasons. Nevertheless, without calling in question 
the territorial sovereignity of each of these three countries, greater 
coherence of the air traffic control in this area and increased safety 
could be achieved. 
49. M_e_n.tj,E~~.'!'.l:'.~.! .. ~!.~a~ of_~he__lack of compatibility between the various sys-· 
tems in use. For example, details of aircraft are passed from one regional 
control centre CRCC) to another by telephone, possibly confirmed by telex. 
In certain areas of dense traffic this procedure may seem elementary and 
even subject to breakdown. However, automatic links are to be set up 
between the French COTRA system and Maastricht; the only computer-to-
computer link being between London RCC and the Maastricht centre. 
The Air Navigation Planning Group under the aegis of the ECAC (European 
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C:ivi l Aviation Conft!rmu:t~) is t:urr·~nt ly rumturt ing lLmq-lt•r·m pt.1nninq r, 11 •1 
general l ink-up. 
(c) fitting of transponders in aircraft 
50. Even in countries or areas where secondary radar is installed, it is not 
completely effective unless all aircraft are fitted with transponders. This 
is not the case either with military aircraft or many light aircraft. 
Leaving aside the clearly insoluble problem of military aircraft, the rules 
governing the types of aircraft which have to be fitted with transponders in 
the various types of airspace are laid down nationally and vary widely from 
one country to the other. In the USA, the FAA rules require all aircraft 
flying above 3,800 m to be fitted with mode C transponders complying with 
strict technical standards. 
51. In Europe, the general use of transponders under identical conditions in 
all countries of the European Community as an additional security measure 
should be made compulsory, especially for general aviation. On the other 
hand, it would also be desirable to require all aircraft to carry mode A or 
mode C transponders, but this would be difficult to implement as can be seen 
from the FAA's failure in its attempt to lower the threshold for the 
compulsory fitting of transponders from 3,800 to 3,000 m. 
<d> The industrial stake in air traffic control equipment 
52. Air traffic control equipment in general represents a huge industrial 
market and a challenge for Europe. European manufacturers are present in force 
- tor example SELENIA (Italy) and THOMSON CSF (France> - producing very efficient 
and competitive equipment. 
without embarking on European protectionism it would be desirable as far as 
possible to use systems designed in the Member States of the European 
Community. Apart from the benefits to European industry and the strengthening 
of their competitive position, this would represent progress towards 
harmonization of air traffic control equipment. 
C. Airports and airways 
<a> General problems 
53. As we have seen, about 75X of accidents and incidents occur on approach 
or landing. Safety conditions at airports therefore require close attention. 
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54. Until last year <1> IFALPA <International Federation of Airline Pilots 
Associations> produced a list of airports classified by degree of risk, taking 
into account tht'ir geographical location, the quality of qroun,1 equipmt"nt .mrl 
th~ rtfici~ncy of control ~ystcms. 
This list changed noticeably from year to year. At different times it included 
European airports such as Corfu, Athens, and Rhodes (in Greece>, Bordeaux, Lille, 
Nantes <where fire-fighting facilities were inadequate> and Ajaccio in France, 
and Rimini and Palermo in Italy. This list is by no means exhaustive. 
55. L.a.':'~.~!l.i_9U_i_danc_:_sY!_t_e~.' of which ILS (Instrument Landing System) is the 
most familiar, are fitted primarily to airports experiencing bad climatic 
conditions, but tend to be installed in all airports above a certain size. Some 
airports in southern Furope, where bad weather is normally of short duration 
and infrequent, give priority to other forms of investment. The mere presence 
of these systems is not enough 
dition by regular calibration. 
they must be kept in perfect operating con-
56. There is a similar problem with ~way ra~~~- It gives a display of all 
aircraft or any other moving object on the runways in all weathers <fog, and at 
night> to prevent any collisions on the ground (3). Mention must be made here 
of the accident in fog on 7 December 1983 at Madrid airport. Even if there are 
other factors than the weather to explain this catastrophe, one cannot help but 
think that runway radar could perhaps have prevented the collision of the two 
aircraft. It also has to be acknowledged that Madrid only has 40 hours of fog 
a year. 
57. The problem of maintenance of airport installations and equipment, in par-
ticular lights, has to be mentioned. These sometimes are inadequate, although 
this may seem surprising when safety is at stake. 
<1> From 1983 onwards, apparently as a result of an agreement between the 
International Civil Airports Association and IFALPA, the latter no longer 
publishes this list. 
<2> Other than approach radar. 
<3> Roissy and Orly airports are equipped with CORAIL radar of this type. 
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<c> Airport rescue and emergency services 
58. The quality and size of services and equipment can reduce the number of 
dead and injured in air disasters and have to be regarded as as a further 
component of passive safety in air transport. Not all airports are similarly 
equipped; this can be confirmed by consulting the IFALPA blacklist mentioned 
in point 54. 
Safety levels could he rdised still further by setting European standards 
higher than the ICAO standards. 
59. Whil~ ground rescue services~~~ generally satisfactory, and a watch must 
b~-~ep~E~!~is, airpo~ts_}~ated by the sea frequently lack facilities. Some 
airports - Rome and Naples have been mentioned - are said to have inshore 
rescue craft only. This situation should be checked and remedied if necessary. 
(d) Specific problems 
60. The location of some airports involves specific safety hazards such as 
bjrQ strike and ingestion. On 18 February 1978 for example at Lyon-Satolas, a 
flock of birds hit the cockpit of a Boeing 747 during take-off, which was then 
dborted; the aircraft overran the end of the runway by 100 metres; the same 
thing happened to a DC 9 on 18 January 1978 at Hamburg. More seriously, on 8 
July 1980 an Airbus leaving Lyon-Satolas airport ingested a large bird 
starting a fire, but the aircraft managed to land safety, and in October 1982 
there was an accident to a Russian aircraft after ingesting crows. In Italy, 
this problem affects Naples airport in particular. 
61. There are ways to counter this problem, but they are not always applied 
and not always effective. Airports could be warned of seasonal migrations. 
D. Weather problems 
62. As we have seen in the ICAO classification of causes of incidents and 
accidents, weather problems substantially affect safety and can bring 
momentary loss of control during flight or crashes on Landing. The most 
frequent hazards in Europe are icing <16% of the cases quoted>, fog <13%), 
wind in very unfavourable conditions (13%), and snow (9%). 
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(,~. rtu· qwtl ity of weatht•r repor·ts woulcl St>t>m to be aclequatt•, .a:. tht' lLAO I~~~-
ur~!: ~how a 75~ success rate, and commercial aircraft are increasingly being 
P.fluippt>d with systems for obtaining their own weather information. However, 
pilots sometimes criticize the quality of the weather information provided by 
air traffic controllers. The latter do in fact read out the weather bulletins 
which they themselves receive every half hour. A controller who has before 
him a weather bulletin reporting fine weather at the airport when he can see a 
storm approaching is not supposed to say anything. He is there to broadcast 
the met. report. If he says what he can see he is then responsible. A control-
ler is always acting on his own responsibility if he reports on the situation 
at the time. 
64. There are other phenomena which are not encountered so frequently in 
Europe but which by their nature are always dangerous: 
windshear: this arises when there is a break in the horizontal component of 
the wind, and big jets are particularly sensitive to it; 
- clear air turbulence: this can be very dangerous on landing or takeoff and 
is undetectible by traditional methods. 
These meteorological phenomena may be detected more or less effectively by 
equipment such as Doppler pulse radar or a laser velocimeter. Aircraft like 
the Boeing 747 have this equipment; the experts should be consulted to 
ascertain whether general installation of this equipment is necessary. 
Before leaving the subject of weather-related phenomena, we should also 
mention optical illusions which can occur in certain places and in certain 
light conditions. 
E. Radio interference 
65. The quality of radio communications affects the safe and efficient 
operation of aircraft: navigational checks, exchanges of information, radio 
navigational and landing aids. 
66. For a number of years there has been vast growth in interference with air 
to grguod radjg communjcatiog, which seems to be due to the proliferation of 
locdl radio stations, private television stations, amateur radio operators, ea 
radio and certain industrial equipment. 
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67. This is mor~ than just il nuh.1nceo ;\lllt 1"1 rttduction tn tht' qu~lity C\f 
communications; apparently it also 1nvolv~s t.:~r mur~ st•r·h,us 1'1ls•·upt "'" 
ereventina the use ot certain navigational instryments such as ILS m~otion~~ 
above, VOR <very high frequencY omnj range), and represents a geoujne bazarg, 
as can be seen from various statements bx oilots reported in the Italjan press 
<especially in the Milan, Bologna and Rome areas>. 
68. Remedies to this situation <ranging from the fitting of suppressors to 
reducing the power of equipment> must initially involve legislation <although 
Italy does have a detailed law on the matter) in cooperation with the CEPT 
(European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administr~tions)~ and 
then enforcement, in view of the dangers represented by such interference. 
II - AVIATION RULES AND PROCEDURES 
69. ICAO plaYs a yital role in ensuring the safety, regularity and efficiency 
of international civil aviation. While it works to give the rules uniformity 
and high standards, its scope is limited by the fact that it can only propose 
recommendations which the States are at liberty to apply or ignore, which 
leads to a disjointed situation as in Western Europe. 
A. Air traffic control in Europe 
70. The speed ot aircraft makes for an absurd situation in Europe, and all the 
more so in the European Community. There are no less than 17 regional control 
centres, naturally using different technical systems. In the United States, 
by way of comparison, with four times the area to cover, there are only 20 
centres and the number will soon be reduced to 12. 
71. The consequences of this situation are felt at several levels. 
financially, as a 1978 study showed, the average cost of air traffic control 
services tor 100 hours of flight was $44 when provided by national control 
centres and $32by centralized control at European level (which would enable 
tares to be reduced). The unified system also offers efficiency (ability to 
handle more traffic> and increased safety. Uniform procedures and 
practices, to take only the most obvious case, could onlt facilitate air 
traffic, for both pilots and controller~. 
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72. The European Parliament's Committee on Transport has advocated the 
principle and expansion of Eurocontrol vigorously enough to make further 
argument on this point redundant here; it will confine itself to stating that 
unified air traffic control would be an additional safety factor for air 
tcattjc in Eyrgo~-
H. Separation ot civil and military airspace 
<a> General nature of the problem 
73. Airspace is in fact mainly military, civil air space consisting of airways 
along which traffic is channelled. Putting it mildly, military use of 
airspace is not very economic. In all European Community countries, civil 
and military air traffic control are separate <1>. 
74. The first problem raised by the division of responsibilities between 
military and civil authorities relates to the capacity and handling of 
traffic. Europe has far from the best possible route network. It is 
generally agreed that it it had, there could be a 15X reduction in distances 
actually covered, cutting the cost of air transport. The most frequent 
criticism of the military authorities voiced by the airlines is the wide 
variation in ground and airborne equipment, and the lack of flexibility to 
tree reserved airspace at short notice. 
75. In some Community countries there is active coordination via bodies such 
as the Delegation a l~espace aerien COEA> in France, which enables valuable 
cooperation between civil and military authorities to take place. Another 
point in favour of Eurocontrol is that in its centres the civil and military 
controllers work side by side (even if civil and military control are 
separate>, which at Least allows better mutual comprehension. 
76. Reference should also be made to the problems which might arise where 
civil and military tratfic use the same airport. It would appear that such a 
~itudtion is likely tn lead to accidents and/or incidents; in this connection 
your rapporteur would refer to a very recent incident that occured on 
18 January 1984 when, as it landed at Toulon/Hyeres Airport, an Air Inter 
Mercury with some one hundred passengers 0~ board almost collided with an Air 
Force Etendard trainer which was taxiing on the runway. 
(1) In fdct, since 1 January 1984 Italy has separate civil air traffic controL~ 
in the past all traffic had been handled by the military. 
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17. In the analysis of near misses quoted above we noted the large proportion 
of incidents involving military aircraft in some countries : 46~ in Italy, 43% 
in the United Kingdom and 38X in Germany (but with a very high proportion of 
unidentified aircraft which are quite often military). In many countries the 
problem seems to be regarded as falling under military security, if we are to 
go by the blackout encountered in our search for detailed information. 
78. The problem seems to be most acute in Germany and Italy, but in the ~atter 
c~>u_n_t_r._r_ _i .t. ~-e:_e!".~.!_o_ 9i ve .. r j~!:. _t?. !'} ~.e.r. p~!>_l_i_c_ ~eb_~t_!. 
There was another incident, on 26 September last, when, according to the pilot, 
two American F-111 fighter bombers passed a few metres away from an ALISARDA 
DC 9 with 84 people on board over Catania; on 23 October an ATI DC 9 taking off 
from Naples had a near-miss with two German F-14's on NATO manoeuvres. On 
15 May 1982 a DC 9 on the Milan-Palermo run experienced a particularly serious 
incident. 
79. This of course brings us to the explosion in flight of an ITAVIA DC 9 on 
27 June 1980 mentioned in Mr DE PASQUALE's motion for a resolution. Suspicion 
as to the link between this disaster and military exercises remain (1). During 
the preparation of this document, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
rransport were officially asked about the conclusions reached by the investi-
~at ion. The replies given or• 18 and 24 November 1983 by the ministries concerned 
make reference to the enquiry in progress being sub judice. Your rapporteur 
would like to take this opportunity to make an official protest at the fact that 
more than three ·years after the destruction of an aircraft the causes have still 
not been made known, and one has to resort to speculation, which is certainly 
more dangerous as regards public opinion than the publication of the results of 
the enquiry. 
RO. The reason for these incidents and their frequency seems to lie in the 
especially intense military activity in the Mediterranean basin, particularly 
that based on aircraft c~rriers. The triangle between Sardinia, Sicily and 
Naples seems to be an especially sensitive area. 
81. However, it cannot be claimed that there is a total lack of cooperation, as 
each exercise is preceded by consultation procedures involving the airlines 
affected and the military and civilian authorities. 
<1> In a recent enquiry the deputy public prosecutor of Palermo acknowledged 
that the air corridor between Ponza and Palermo could no longer be consid-
ered safe. 
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82. In explanation of the many near misses, civil pilots often blame the 
reckless attitude of some military pilots flying supersonic aircraft, hence 
much faster than civil aircraft, carrying very high performance radar which 
they seem to think exempt them from some of the rules of air navigation. 
8~. The problem needs to be studied carefully to determine its exact size in 
the Commynjtr coyotries; §Qecifis wars of cutting down the frequency of these 
~epalling occurrences should then be considered. 
c. Protection of civil aviation 
84. The shooting down of the Korean Airlines Boeing 747 has shown how safety 
in the air can be deliberately jeopardized in peacetime. 
Without dwelling on the tragic circumstances of this disaster, the loss of 
human life involved and the moral and political judgements an act of this 
nature deserves, it is vital that this kind of disaster does not recur, 
especially during a period of international tension. 
as. At its meetings of 15 and 16 September 1983, ICAO adopted a resolution (1) 
deciding to open an investigation into the destruction of the Boeing 747 and 
also decided to give the highest priority to consideration of the question of 
an amendment to the International Civil Aviation Convention embodying a 
renunchtion of the use of force against civil aircraft, to be considered and 
.uiopted by the end ot the fi est quarter of 1984. 
These actions deserve our encouragement, and the Member States of the European 
Community should jointly support the adoption of a text with genuine impact. 
<1> See Annex Ill 
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Ill - HUMAN FACTORS 
A. The general problem 
86. According to an lATA study carried out in 1975, which seems to be 
confirmed by all parties involved in air transport, 70% of accidents involve 
human error. There are several aspects to this problem. Is not the human 
factor frequently used to cover up for other factors <especially those 
involving equipment procedures>? Oo we have to regard human error as 
inevitable to cover up mistakes by political and economic syste-s <as in the 
case of the destruction of the Korean Airlines 747>? 
87. Your rapporteur believes that a large proportion of accidents and 
incidents may be blamed upon human failure, but that this fact should nos 
!erve as a perpetual pretext for doing nothing to solve specific problems. 
88. On the other hand there would seem to be some reluctance to accept expla-
nations which are too simple or too human for 'advanced' societies {1) <alco-
holism, drug use, etc.,> bloody-mindedness arising from disputes, and ordinary 
fatigue. Many more accidents than one might think are due to psychological 
phenomena. However, in view of the vastness of the subject we shall confine our-
selves to some specific aspects. 
~. The undesired effects of automation 
89. While major technical progress has brought high levels of safety, it has 
also prOduced negative and even undesired side-effects. For example, many 
accidents or incidents occur during the transition from autopilot to manual 
control. The more automation built into an aircraft, the more the crew's ·mpn~­
toring role becomes primarily one of vigilance, which at one time or another, 
and particularly on very long flights, tends to flag. Flight crew boredom is 
inevitable <2>. 
<1> The lATA 'Airline Guide to human factors• deals with these problems, 
but what is the size of its circulation? 
<2> we reach the psychologically absurd situation where an automatic system 
is 100X reliable and the crew has to be ready to react at a second's 
notice. 
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90. The psychological framework of crews then becomesvital, and ~!._~hn_ica~r_e_f_i_!'l_~.­
m_~-~- _!11~!..!_!>_-:_.!_~-~E.!"P~-~-!-d___Ey psych_o_l:oqj_:a l ~rch. Airlines such as All TALl A 
are instilling unusual concepts into their pilots, of 'missions to be accomplished' 
and 'responsibility for human lives' rather than piloting aircraft, in order to 
sustain and increase motivation. From one point of view these laudable schemes 
by the airline are rather disturbing, if they are regarded as essential to safety, 
and tend to show the fallibility of pilots. It seems in fact that the major air-
lines in Europe are very aware of these problems and apply very positive policies 
for the safety of their passengers. 
91. Can new generation aircraft (Boeing 747 and 757, Airbus A 310> be operated 
completely safely by a crew of two pilots only ? In this dispute between the 
management of certain airlines and various professional organizations your 
rapporteur has been given cogent arguments by both sides. One has to recognize 
t_h_e __ c_o_n_f_~-~-c_t_E_f __ i_!"l_t_e_~~~b_!_t~een professional solidarity and the desire to cut 
air crew costs. 
92. It is therefore very difficult to take a black-and-white view of the 
problem. Where the safety of hundreds of passengers is involved, decisions must 
allow for the fact that human behaviour is still the decisive factor in 
hazardous situations<1>. It would therefore seem that where there is doubt, 
a~ there is in our case, one should give priority, even at a financial cost, 
to the_maximum desree of safety provided by three pilots in the cockpit. 
o. Pilot training 
93. In western countries, modern airline pilot training is rigorous. On the 
other hand, the granting of especially VFR pilots' licences sometimes seems, 
perhaps in a restricted number of cases, to be perfunctory. The USA is the 
outstanding case, where it is still possible to obtain a professional pilot's 
licence with a relatively low number of flying hours on very basic aircraft.<2> 
<1> Space ventures using the most refined equipment have shown how far human 
intervention is still decisive. 
<2> This explains the reluctance of many countries to recognize these licences. 
See in particular the article on airline pilot training in INTERAVIA 
No. 12, December 1982. 
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• 94. For a relatively modest sum the advantages of a holiday and pilot training 
course may be combined with a licence <which some Member States of th~ Community 
will recognize without difficulty) at the age of 17, when a person is not even 
allowed to drive a car in Europe. We should therefore consider tightening up 
the rules. 
E. Pilot recruitment 
95. We have expressed fears about the maintenance of aircraft by certain small 
companies or charter companies which are in economic difficulties or simply 
unscrupulous. The same problem arises in connection with pilot recruitment. 
I_t __ i_s_!'_e_c:_~~-ary __ ~--~.].D!.~_i!' ___ ~_v_e!Y h~~~-~nda_r_9 of recruitment and of quali-
_f_i_c_a_!i_~_s ___ f~r- _a_l_~~2.'!P~.!'2!_~, which does not always seem to be the case. Some-
times an air disaster has to occur to show that the flying staff employed, while 
complying with JCAO standards, would not have been employed by major companies. 
This is not a case of raising doubts about the small airline companies, most of 
which are completely honest, but recognizing that a very small minority of them 
may have shortcomings. 
96. Some European countries seem to be short of properly qualified air traffic 
controllers <1>. Furthermore, centres having highly skilled staff have also 
to cope with problems of continuous training with the constant progress being 
made in equipment and techniques. This constitutes further evidence of the need 
for unified management of air traffic control which would also provide contin-
uous training to uniform standards for all Member States of the European 
Community. 
G. Use of a common language 
97. English is the universal language of communication in international comm-
ercial aviation; although for reasons of linguistic legitimacy this might some-
times be regretted, safety makes it imperative that a single language be used. 
98. A knowledge of English is therefore a vital and obvious requirement for 
pilots and controllers. What is forgotten is that this knowledge is sometimes 
limited to purely technical phraseology, which does not matter in normal circun.-
stances but can be disastrous in unusual situations. 
99. Incidents or accidents listed under 'misunderstanding of instructions• or 
'incorrect information passed on• (2), may be ascribed to inadequate linguistic 
attainment. 
rrr llfie"tlieTo-r--nbT"Rembers of the European Community 
<2> See the information in the ICAO ADREP data bank 
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100. The solution would seem to be very simple, but we have to be very cautious 
as to the actual scope for verification and above all as regards the varying 
assessments of the problem. 
101. Although we are talking here about impressions rather than actual safety, 
your rapporteur does not wish to ignore the psychological aspect for air passen-
qers. Although their immediate reaction is to deny fear of flying, surveys have 
~hown that many of them still regard it as an ordeal and, despite public rela-
tions schemes, the airlines underestimate the problem. 
102. Little attention is paid to conditions while passengers are waiting <before 
departure>, such as the absence of definite information in the event of delays, 
and the lowering for obvious financial reasons of standards of passenger comfort 
in flight. 
The airlines' attitude is all the more incomprehensible as it is jeopardizing 
the long-term future of air transport. 
PART THREE : ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
10~. As a major· world air transport user, but also as an aeronautical equipment 
manu r ac turer·, !.~ .. 5-u.r.op_e_~_n- _c_C?.'!'.!':'uni_ty ___ m_us t~-deve lo~~'!'P!ehens i ve and vigorous 
po_l_i_c_y __ to~_a_~_d_~--t~~!__:>_a_!_ety~ of air -~!~~syort. 
104. -~~various aspects of this policy have been covered in this report. It 
j~-~?~-~~-!esponsibility of the Commission to formalize them and draw up the 
~~esponding action programme in its second memorandum on air transport in 
Europe. 
It would be unacceptable for the Commission to omit air transport safety if it 
wants to develop an air transport policy, unless it wishes to limit it to a fares 
policy, the short-term economic aims of which are obviously less ambitious. 
105. The European Community should certainly not adopt standards and procedurer. 
~_h_i_c_h_~_L_~_j_sola.!!_!.!_ and ~l! ze it_ f in_anc ially, but should develop a general 
~.o.rl_c_ept __ o_!~af_e..!X -~~~orda~e_w_i.!_~ _2}_s__!'J gh safety standards. 
- 'passive safety' in European aircraft construction; 
- European-designed air traffic control equipment and its use by the 
Member States. 
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10i'. To forestall the tr'.lditional .ugument that Community drtion is tlllPLISStblt• 
in this area because of the international nature of civil aviation, this problem 
must be clearly recognized in the discussions. 
108. ~~tly, as regards the 'passive safety' of aircraft, it is only in the 
~.S_!' __ t~-~~--~2.r!_i_s_.being don! by the aircraft companies in conjunction with the 
FAA <Federal Aviation Administration>, _c~!:!.Y._i!!_g_~..!__!:_ese~_rch_ and laying down 
s!.a_n9.a_r:_d~--~~~i~-~-~ ll be adopted by _t_~! intergovernmental organizations. Europe 
has its own leading aeronautical industry with AIRBUS Industries and its involve-
ment in drawing up safety regulations is not only politically necessary but is 
a growth factor for technical progress in this area. 
109. A_s_._r:_egards a.J.!-~.!'~!.!~~n!!~-~-e~ui.P.!!!!nt, European equipment is simply not 
b!}~9_promote~ and there is no Community action designed to encourage industrial 
cooperation or allow a Community preference. 
110. !2-~~~i~l~~~-js vital that th~ European Community, through the Committee 
on Transport Infrastructure, ~hould be able to take part in the financing of 
a_i_r. _t_r~_!_f_i: ___ c.o!'.t_~ol_or ai_rport_J~_:;~-~-~~~-<:ms_ designed to improve air transport 
safety. 
Of the most urgent and specific measures, the following must be taken into 
account. 
111. T_h,e __ C}l!"_m_u_n_~_!.Y __ a_s_.s_u_~.!!'.~:._t __ f.i_r_:;_t_ ~~f- ~a_l_~ .. h.a~~ -~bs.! . r.~~-_:;_!atus~~-c~o. on 
th~ same tooting as the professional associations, having regard to the vital 
interests it represents, before assuming a status more in k~eping with its 
role. 
11?. Uniformity of air navigation standards at European level through the 
~O.O!~J~a~ion a~~~~munity ~:ve~of_ 'differences' regarding the provisions of 
.~.n_d ___ a!'_n_e_x_:_s_!2._~he Chicag~_Conven~.i-~~, as the European Parliament stated in its 
resolution of 16 December 1982, should be one of the results of this involvement. 
The European Community must take a common attitude on the matter, as differences 
on matters of substance are not fundamental. 
113. Imp_r:_f:>_v_e~ __ a ire raft acc_i_~ent invest i gat_i ons and data banks. The directive 
of 16 December 1980 (80/1266/EEC) initiated cooperation on aircraft accident 
investigations. This was a first step which needs to be consolidated by a 
comprehensive information system covering incidents and accidents occurring ovel' 
the territory of the European Community or involving aircraft of undertakings 
in the European Community. 
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Jf it is to r·epresent genuine progre!:~, the system should: 
- encompass all incidents and accidents by voluntary and compulsory reports, the 
former providing information on human factors and the latter on equipment <1>; 
- have access to all information held by every Member State and air transport 
undPrtakings in the European Community regarding incidents and accidents 
between civil and military aircraft. 
11'•· Finally, the European Commun'ity must seek ways to help improve the coord-
i_n_at i.<:>!' .. ~f. 22!. _t_r~_f_!_i~ .~O!_l_!:_!'~l_, exploring all possible avenues and in par1- i ,.,JI :. 
the ~-~~-!]~}ion ot_~-~~~ROL_by extending it .!O cover all Member States and 
increasing its powers to return this organization to its original role and put 
an end to a situation which is technically, economically and politically absurd. 
++++++++++++++++++++ 
The rapporteur is aware that the breadth of the subject and the 
rules on the maximum number of pages allowed for the explanatory 
statement have meant that many aspects which should have been 
treated at length have been dealt with briefly and expresses the 
hope that they will form the subject of separate reports during 
the next parliamentary term. 
The rapporteur also wishes to thank at this time all the indi-
viduals, experts, representatives of airline companies and of 
pilot and air traffic control associations and those from the 
ministries of various countries, for the assistance they have 
given in the compilation of this report. 
(1) As expressly requested by ICAO 
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MOIION FOR A RESOLUTION - Doe. 1-364/8? 
tabled by Mr OF PASQUALE, Mr CAROSSINO, Mr VITALE, Mr PAPAPIETRO, 
Mr BONACCINI, Mr CARDIA, Mr SEGRE and Mr CERAVOLO 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the safety of air transport in the zone between the islands of Ponza 
and Ustica 
The European Parli!!pent, 
A - Deeply concerned by the frequent report• of 'ir.c!eenta• and 
interference in the corridors reserved for civil air traffic 
on the route to Palermo in the vicinity of the island of Ustica, 
B - Alarmed by the coincidence between such 'incidents' and the NATC 
military exercises in the region, 
c - Recalling with dismay the air disaster in which 81 passengers 
died and which occurred in the same zone two years ago through 
an explosion the causes of which have not yet been established, 
D - Convinced of the need to guarantee European citizens the highea~ 
possible level of safety in air transport, 
1. Requests the Commiaaion and the Council to do their utmost to ensure 
cooperation and assistance with the inquiries into the accidents 
which have occurred in the airspace between the islands of Ponza and 
Ustica, as laid down in the council Directive of 16 December 1980, and 
to inform the European Parliament of the results thereof: 
2. Recalls the liat of priori'ties in the air transport sector adopted 
by the Council in June 1978, Which provides for search, rescue and 
salvage operations and inquiries in the event of air craahes, and 
asks what meaaures they are arranging to adopt actually to give 
effect to thoae priorities, 
3. Reaffirms the objective of the creation of a European airspace as 
requested by the European Parliament several times and proposed by 
the Commission in ita 1975 action programme and strongly urges 
the Council to implement it as soon as possible; 
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4. Declares that the safety of air transport must be regarded as a 
central issue in Conununity transport policy and considers therefore 
that there can be no delay in drawing up measures to guarantee it. 
having particular regard bO the problem of respect for the a~Lu~ac~ 
reserved for civil aviationr 
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission of the European Communities and to the Member States of 
the European community. 
- 43 -
PE 86.425/fin/Ann. I a 

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
Doe. 1-21/83 
tabled by Mr MOORHOUSE, Mr SEEFELD, Mr JANSSEN van RAAY and Mr ALBERS 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on Community accession to the EUROCONTROL Convention 
A. having regard to the International Convention of 13 December 1960 on 
Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL Convention) and 
the fact that it has been signed by seven Member States, 
B. having regard to previous resolutions on the improvement of the operation 
and control of air traffic (Doe. 49/78 and Doe. 106/79>, but more partic-
ularly with regard to the latest reports of the Committee on Transport 
(Doe. 1-274/80 and Doe. 1-24/82>, 
c:. wherP.,jS ttu• s ignatoriP.s of the EIJROCONTROL Convent ion have repeatedly 
i!JnorNi the "forement ioned resolutions and reports of the European 
Parliament, 
1. Draws the attention of the Commission to the need to simplify the regulation 
of air transport in the European Communities and reduce costs; 
2. Calls upon the Commission, the Council and the Governments of the Member 
States to negotiate accession to, to ratify and to enforce the EUROCONTROL 
~onvention so as to permit the Community to coordinate air traffic control 
activities more effectively; 
1. Cdlls upon each ot the signatories to the EUROCONTROL Convention to play a 
full and et feet ive part in the activities of EUROCONTROL; 
4. Calls upon the signatories to the EUROCONTROL Convention to revoke the 
limitations upon EUROCONTROL's activities and powers imposed in 1982; 
5. Calls upon the Member States that have not already signed and ratified the 
EUROCONTROL Convention to do so as soon as possible; 
6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the Governments of the Member States and the EUROCONTROL 
Organization. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION - Ooc. 1-674/83 
tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the brutal shooting down of a Korean airliner by the Soviet airforce 
The European ParliaMent, 
A. deeply and sadly shocked at the senseless action of the Soviet airforce· 
which deliberately attacked, struck and dest~oyed while in the air a Korean 
civil aircraft killing all 269 persons on board in the tragic event, 
B. considers unacceptable the violent and inhuman procedure that led to this 
disaster as the consequence of an arrogant and blind political and military 
attitude based on violence which is peculiar to regimes devoid of liberty 
and democracy, 
c. considers this unqualifiable event to be an act of provocation politically 
inconsistent with hopes for peace and normal relations between the peoples 
which the democratic countries of the West are seeking to foster through 
numerous initiatives, 
D. concerned at the increasing number of uncontrollable dangers which may be 
br~ught about by the automat'ic initiation of certain military procedures, 
1. Proposes a detailed investigation of the regulations governing international 
civil aviation procedures in order to p~vent the recurrence of si•ilar 
disasters; 
2. Calls on the Governments of the Member States of the Eu~opean Community to 
obtain accurate information and politically viable and detailed explanations 
on the whole sad and brutal event; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Eu~opean Council, 
the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministers •eeting in political coop-
eration and the Commission. 
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lON FOR A RESOLUTION - Doe. 1-734/83 
led by Mr SEEFELD, Mr GLINNE and Mr KLINKENBORG 
behalf of the Socialist Group 
suant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
measures following the shooting-down of a South Korean airliner 
shocked at the totally unjustifiable shooting-down of 1 South Korean 
a;rliner by the Soviet Union, 
noting also the •any •air •isses• which are caused tiae and again by 
uncoordinated •ilitary and civilian air traffic control, 
anxious to avoid such dangers for passenger and crew in future, 
De•ands the stepping-up of ••••urea to coordinate the safety of air traffic 
between all states; 
Calls for a review of whether the guidelines of the relevant international 
organizations, such 11 the lCAO, art still up-to·datt; 
Wishes to see better coordination of the safety aeasures in civilian and 
•ilitary eir traffic; 
Cells for the drawing-up by the United Nations of 1 convention on the 
protection of civilian air traffic; 
Requests the co .. ission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers aeeting 
in political cooperation to take action in this direction and to for•ulate 
introductory proposels; 
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Co.aission and the Foreign Ministers •eeting in political cooperation. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION - Doe. 1-973/83 
tabled by Mr EPHREMlDlS, Mr ADAMOU and Mr ALAVANOS 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the safety of civilian flights during military exercises 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas, during the NATO 'Display Determination• exercise in the 
Mediterranean at the beginning of October, American warplanes 
repeatedly violated Greek national airspace and paralysed or 
seriously disrupted the Civil Aviation communications system of 
control centres, thus greatly hazarding the safety of civilian 
flights, 
B. having regard to the repeated protests by the Greek Government, 
which currently holds the Presidency of the EEC, and the inadequate 
·responses of the US Government, 
C. whereas the aforesaid Americ1n violations constituted a danger to 
civilian aircraft belonging to companies in all the EEC Member 
States using the air corridors over the Aegean at the time, 
D. having already shown its interest in metsures to ensure the safety 
of civilian flights, ptrticularly since the downing of the South 
Korean passenger jumbo-jet, with regard to which no one can with 
certainty exclude the possibility th1t it was being used for 
military purposes, 
1. Protests to the US authorities at the fact that, a few weeks after 
the shooting-down of the South Koretn jumbo-jet, they placed at 
risk the safety of civilian flights by European and other airlines 
along the international air corridors over the Aegean coming under 
the Athens FIR; 
2. Calls on the Member States to put forward proposals in the ICAO 
and other competent bodies for the safety of civilian flights 
during military ex•rcists; 
3. Instructs it1 Prteidtnt to forward thil risolution to tht Commission, 
the Council, the Govern•ente of Mt~er St1te1, the US Govern•ent 
and the ICAO. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
on air traffic safety 
1. With a view to improving air traffic safety in Europe, to which 
actions to you attach priority in the foll0t11ing areas: 
(a) material and equipment (including meteorological 
equipment) on the grounq and on board aircraft? 
(b) air traffic control and procedure? 
(c) human factors: training of pilots and air traffic 
controllers, psychological conditions in flight, 
number of pilots in the cockpit, tenminology employed? 
2. What in your opinion might be the contributions of the European 
Parl iarrt:nt to the praootion of these actions? 
?.l~l:~} f.l~_ ~~:~~ 
1. What are the principle factors in accidents or incidents which 
jeopardise air traffic safety? 
2. What data do you possess concerning near-misses in European 
air space (nunber, circUI_'IlStances) which have cane to your knowledge? 
3. Could you provide exanples of incidents in the air or dangerous 
situations not deemed near-misses'but which might, through an 
accumulation of different factors, jeopardise air traffic safety? 
4. TO what extent to you consider that the cohabitation of civil 
and military air traffic can affect air safety (please· illustrate 
your repl~es if possible with specific examples)? 
5. How much inportance do you attach in general terms to meteorological 
conditions and the exactitude of information communicated to pilots? 
6. Do you consider that the introduction and developnent of advanced 
technology, leading to an ever increasing degree of automation of 
aircraft, has undesirable side-effects, if so, what effects? 
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ftH: COUNCIL 
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY 
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION <ICAO) 
COUNCIL AT ITS EXTRAORDINARY SITTING OF 
15 AND 16 SEPTEMBER 1983 
KAVING CONSIDERED the fact that • Korean Air Llnes clvtl aircraft was destroyed on 
September 1, 1983 by Sovi~t military aircraft, 
EXPR}:SSING lta deepest sympathy wlth the families bereaved ln this tragic incident, 
URGING the so.,let IJnlon to a .. lst the bereaved families to visit the aite of the 
inctdent and t1l return the bodies of the victims and their belongings promptly, 
DEF.PLY DEPLORING th~ d~struction of an aircraft in commercial international service 
resulting in the loss of 269 innocent lives, 
RECOGNIZING that such use of armed force against international civil aviation is 
incompatible with the norma governing international behaviour and elementary 
considerations of humanity and wlth the rules, Standards and Recommended 
Practices enshrined in the Chicago Conlo'ention and its Annexes and invokes 
generally recognized legal consequences, 
REAFFIRMING the prlnclple that States, when intercepting civil aicraft, should not use 
~ons against them, 
CONCERNED that the Soviet Unlon has not so far acknowledged the paramount importance of 
the 1111fety and lives of passengers and crew when dealtng with civil at.rctaft 
intercepted in or near ita terrltorlal airspace, 
EMPHASIZING that this action constitutes a grave threat to the safety of international 
civil avlatlon which aakes clear the urgency of undertaking an immediate and full 
investigation of the said aetlon and the need for further improvement of 
1,roc~dure~ relating to the interception of civil aircraft, with a view to 
tonsurlng thljt such a tragic incident doee not recur, • 
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DIRECTS the Secretary Genera\ to institute an investigation to determine the 
facta and technical aspect• relating to the f\lght and destruction of the 
aircraft and to provide an lnteria report to the Council within 30 days of 
the adoption of this Resolution and a complete report during the llOth 
Session of the Council, 
URGES all parties to co-operate fully in the investigation, 
FURTHER DIRECTS the Secretary General to urgently report to the Council on 
the statue of adherence to, and implementation of, the provisions of the 
Chicago Convention, its Anne~es and other related documents as they bear 
upon this incident, 
DIRECTS the Air Navisatlon Comaiasion urgently: 
(a) to review the provisions of the Convention, its Annexes and other 
related docu.ents and conaider poasible aaendments to prevent a 
recurrence of such a tragic incident; 
(b) to exa~ine waye to improve the co-ordination of coMmunication systems 
between military and civil aircraft and air traffic control services 
and to improve pr:oceduree ln cases involving the identification and 
lnterc@ption of civil aircraft; 
INSTRUCTS the President of the Council to report this decision to the 24th 
Session of the Asse~bty of the Organization fo~ the Assembly to take the 
appropriate action. 
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THE COUNC'IT. I 
CONVINCED ~f the need to improve the existing international rules or to adopt 
new rules aimed at ensuring the safety of civil aircraft; 
~J)NG noted C-WP/7695 submitted by France on 15 September 1983; 
1.- DECIDES to instruct the Air Navigation Commission to 
undertake without delay the following technical tasks: 
a) - review of the conditions of implementation of the Standards 
contained in paragraph 2.13 of Annex 11 to the Chicago 
Convention and proposals for possible recommendations 
concerning the co-ordination between military authorities 
and air traffic services; 
b) - review of all the provisions contained in Attachment A to 
Ann~x 2 to the Chicago Convention concerning the interception 
of civil aircraft with a view to examining the feasibility 
of their incorporation aa Standards in the body of Annex 2, 
particularly as far as paragraph 2.3 f) of this Attachment 
is concerned which recommends the frequency 121.5 MHz as 
th~ one with which interceptor aircraft should be equipped; 
c) - review of the conditions of implementation of the Standards 
contained in paragr<~ph 3.3.1.1.2.1 d) of Annex 2 to the 
Chicago Convention and proposals for possible recommendations 
to be made on the bnsis of this text, particularly as regards 
the submission of flight plans when civil aircraft may need to 
fly over areas close to zones or routes to which reference is 
mnde in thdt paragraph; 
d) - study of new provisions which could be included in Attachment A 
to Annex 2 or in any other relevant text and which would make 
lt possible to achieve the harmonization of procedures for the 
interception of civil aircraft as well as introduce further 
pr~cauttona for the conduct of interceptions. 
2.- ASKS all Contracting States to forward to the Secretariat as soon 
as· possible any co~nts they may have on paragraph l above. 
\ 
\ 
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3.- REQY!STS the Secretary General to &ive the Air Navigation 
Comm!1aion any a1si1tance it .ay require. 
4.- REQUESTS the Air Navigation Commission to submit to the 
Council a detailed report on the tasks entrusted to it by 
thia Resolution aa aoon as possible and, in any case, before 
16 December 1983. 
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